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Abstract:  
By its very nature, international migration has an impact on the relations between 
countries of origin and destination.  In the case of large-scale refugee flows, such 
movements also affect the relations between destination countries, as unilateral policy 
responses by one states often produces significant externalities for other states.   
Resulting free-riding opportunities undermine cooperation and lead to the under-
provision of collective security measures aimed at controlling the movement of 
displaced persons.  In recognition of these collective action problems, international 
institutions have played an increasingly influential role in the management of global 
asylum- and refugee flows.  This paper highlights the security considerations that 
have prompted European states into cooperation through the institutions of the 
European Union.  By analysing these collective efforts from an international public 
goods perspective, this paper offers new ways to assess the efficiency and equity of 
international refugee burden-sharing initiatives. 
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 (1) Introduction: Forced Migration, Security and Refugee Burden-Sharing 
 
Forced migration flows to Europe differ significantly from those to the US.  Most 
persons arriving in the US for humanitarian reasons do so as resettled refugees which 
allows for considerable control over numbers and for the pre-screening of those 
admitted.  In Europe, in contrast, individuals claiming persecution arrive almost 
exclusively as (spontaneous) asylum-seekers at the border and the decision as to 
whether or not they qualify for protection is therefore taken while the claimants are 
already on a state’s territory.  The security challenges resulting from spontaneous 
asylum seekers are therefore potentially greater than those of resettled refugees.   
Asylum seekers have long been retarded as constituting a variety of security 
challenges for European states, in particular as they have constitutes a large, in some 
countries (such as in Germany in 1992) the largest category of foreign arrivals.  Often, 
these challenges have been closely related to the massive fluctuations in asylum 
seekers and the limited effectiveness of receiving states to control such flows.  As 
such, the events surrounding September 11 reinforced a pre-existing European 
security agenda vis-à-vis asylum seekers in Europe (Guild 2003; Huysman 2000; 
Bigo 1994) and strengthened a belief in the necessity for closer cooperation among 
the EU Member States on border-control issues more generally.  Although, the 
Member Members devoted the first EU Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting 
following the US 9/11 attacks exclusively to the EU response on security and others 
measures to combat terrorism, the specific measures adopted focused on wider 
security issues (judicial cooperation, cooperation between policy and intelligence 
services, cooperation with the US and joint measures at the EU’s external borders) but 
did not make an explicit link between terrorist attacks and the inflow of asylum 
seekers into Europe.
1  Hence, unlike in the US where September 11 had quite a wide-
ranging impact on US immigration law, in Europe the terrorist attacks in New York, 
Madrid and London were seen as again highlighting the need to consolidate efforts to 
achieve more effective border controls in Europe through enhanced cooperation in the 
wider Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area.  The major driving force behind 
developments in EU JHA matters in general and moves towards a common European 
asylum policy in particular, were therefore not a response to particular terrorist 
                                                 
1 Conclusions of the Extraordinary Council meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection, 
Brussels, 20 September 2001. 
  2incidences such as those of September 11 but are the result of broader security 
implications (perceived and real) of the European integration process itself (Stetter 
2000; Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex and Ucarer 2002; Noll and Byrne 2002).  Two 
developments are particular important here.  First, the removal of internal borders as 
part of the single market programme and the Schengen process which means that once 
inside one Member State, foreigners can move quite easily on to other Member States.  
Second, the process of enlargement which meant that over time the external borders 
of the EU have been faced with poorer and more volatile neighbours while the 
capacity of the new Member States to effectively control their (and hence the EU’s) 
borders is considerably lower than that of the old Member States.   
 
The security concerns related to these developments have been heightened by the 
highly varied attractiveness among the EU Members States as destination countries 
for asylum seekers, leading to the fear that some states might become overburdened 
by asylum inflows and that unilateral restrictive efforts to gain control over such 
flows might result in highly undesirable consequences for the other Member States, 
asylum seekers and the wider integration process itself.  Recent developments towards 
a common asylum policy in Europe have therefore been closely linked with the 
perceived need for ‘burden-‘ or ‘responsibility-sharing’ in this area (Suhrke 1997; 
Noll 2000; Thielemann 2003).  The Member States’ commitment in this regard was 
perhaps most clearly stated at the Brussels European Council meeting in November 
2004.  In their final declaration, EU leaders stressed that the development of a 
common policy in the field of asylum, migration and borders "should be based on 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its financial implications and 
closer practical co-operation between member states".
2  This concern has been echoed 
by the UNHCR for which ‘burden-sharing is a key to the protection of refugees and 
the resolution of the refugee problem’.
3  The then UNHCR High Commissioner 
Lubbers stated in 2005: 
‘There is a need for responsibility- and burden-sharing within the EU […].  I 
fear that high protection standards will be difficult to maintain in a system 
                                                 
2 Brussels European Council, 4/5 November 2004, Presidency Conclusions, page 18. 
3 Official Documents Burden-Sharing - Discussion Paper Submitted By UNHCR Fifth Annual Plenary 
Meeting Of The APC; ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, Vol. 17 
(2001)]; URL: http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/17.html 
  3which shifts responsibility to states located on the external border of the EU, 
many of which have limited asylum capacity.’
4
However, despite of a lot of legislative activity, the EU’s refugee burden-sharing 
initiatives have been fully effective.  Some of the recent measures introduced even 
appear to have reinforced the imbalances in responsibilities that one has been able to 
observe.  As such, the EU has arguably undermined its own burden-sharing objectives 
with security implications for individuals inside and outside the Member States. 
 
To substantiate this argument, this paper will first discuss the extent and causes of 
unequal asylum and refugee burdens.  This will be followed by an analysis of the 
various types of burden-sharing initiatives available in this area.  Finally, there will be 
an analysis of the specific refugee burden-sharing instruments developed within the 
EU’s emerging asylum system and a discussion of why their effectiveness has been 
limited and sometimes counterproductive.   
 
 
(2) How (un)equal is the distribution of refugee burdens? 
 
When comparing their relative contributions to refugee protection, states are likely to 
disagree about how such contributions should be assessed.  However, by looking at 
some of the most directly linked responsibilities associated with international refugee 
flows, it is possible to arrive at some approximations of relative responsibilities that 
countries are faced with or prepared to accept.  Table 1 below tries to do just that.  It 
presents UNHCR data on asylum and resettlement for a selection of 15 OECD 
countries for the period 1994-2002.  Column 1 shows the average number of asylum 
applications received in each country over the time period and column 2 indicates 
what percentage of these arrivals were given permanent or temporary protection status 
by the state in question.  Column 3 lists the number of refugees who arrived vial 
resettlement programs (i.e. not as ‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers).  The final column 
combines the numbers of ‘recognised’ asylum seekers (i.e. those who have been 
granted some from of protection status) and the average number of resettled refugees 
and puts the combined total in relation to a country’s population size (as a measure of 
absorption capacity).  This gives us the average accepted asylum/refugee burden for 
each state, relative to a country’s size.  This ‘relative’ figure, arguably is a more 
                                                 
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, Talking Points for the Informal 
Justice and Home Affairs Council (Luxembourg, 29 January 2005) 
  4appropriate measure of ‘burdens’ or ‘responsibilities’ than comparing absolute 
numbers of asylum-seekers/refugees that do not take account of vast differences in 
countries size and hence absorption capacity.  One finds strong variation not just 
among OECD states but also among EU countries, with states such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden facing asylum and refugee related responsibilities 
that are significantly higher than those of other Member States.   
 
 
(3) Why are refugee burdens unequally distributed? 
 
When trying to account for the current distribution of refugee burdens among 
countries, three principal explanations have been suggested.  These related to free-
riding opportunities, state interests and variation in pull-factors. 
 
Free-Riding Opportunities 
Similar to the NATO burden-sharing debate, there have been protests and free-riding 
accusations from the main receiving countries of asylum seekers as well as threats by 
some states to opt out of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees to 
which all OECD countries are signatories. A number of scholars, most prominently 
Suhrke (1998), have suggested that refugee protection has (at least in part) important 
‘public good’ characteristics. Suhrke argues that the reception of displaced persons 
can be regarded an international public good from which all states benefit.  In her 
view, increased security can be regarded as the principal (non-excludable and non-
rival) benefit, as an accommodation of displaced persons can be expected to reduce 
the risk of them fuelling and spreading the conflict they are fleeing from.  One might 
therefore expect substantial free-riding opportunities, similar to those that have be 
observed with regard to the provision of other international public goods such as 
collective defence.  Unlike in the case of NATO burden-sharing where empirical 
evidence suggests that larger countries have been exploited by small countries (Olson 
and Zeckhauser 1966), no similar picture emerges when analysing the refugee 
reception burden.  In fact, the evidence presented in Figure 1 suggests that in the case 
of the reception of refugees by OECD countries, it is mostly smaller states which 
appear to shoulder disproportionate burdens.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
State Interests and Normative Preferences 
  5Another way to try to explain the unequal distribution of refugee burdens is to analyse 
specific state interests and countries' normative preferences in this area.  Some 
economists have developed a refined version of Olson’s public goods approach, one 
that is based on the so-called 'joint product' model (Sandler 1992).
5   This model 
suggests that what might appear as a pure public good often brings in fact excludable 
(private) benefits to a country.  From this 'joint-product model' we would expect that a 
country’s contributions to the provision of a particular collective good (which has 
both public and private characteristics) will be positively related to the proportion of 
excludable benefits accruing to that country.  It seems reasonable to assume that one 
country’s efforts in the area of refugee protection will have some positive spill over 
effects to other countries in the region.  However, refugee protection arguably, 
provides a spectrum of outputs ranging from purely public to private or country-
specific outputs. This means that refugee protection provides more than the single 
output of ‘security’ implied by the pure public goods model: it also provides country 
specific benefits such as status enhancement or the achievement of ideological goals 
(such as when West during the cold war was keen to accept political refugees from 
behind the Iron Curtain).  Moreover, we can also expect relatively more benefits from 
refugee protection measures accruing to countries closer to a refugee generating 
conflict.
6  In other words what is often regarded as a public good has in fact 
excludable (private) benefits to a country.  The ‘joint product model’ suggests that a 
country’s contributions to the provision of refugee protection (with its public and 
private characteristics) will be positively related to the proportion of excludable 
benefits accruing to that country.  From a norm-based perspective, patterns of burden-
sharing can be explained with reference to the observed variation in states’ 
commitment to norms that are related to the particular burden in question.  From this 
perspective the burden that a state is prepared to accept will be linked to the strengths 
of a state's preferences on safeguarding certain norms (such as general human rights 
standards or norms of distributive justice).  It has been shown that states’ willingness 
to shoulder protection burdens are positively correlated with their relative 
commitment to the norm of solidarity with people in need and that countries which 
                                                 
5 For an attempt to apply the join-product model to refugee protection see Betts (2003). 
6 However, empirical tests on this in the area of refugee protection have produced mixed results.   
During the Kosovo conflict, Greek sensibilities concerning its minority in the north of Greece meant 
that Greece accepted a lot fewer Kosovo refugees than one would have expected on the basis of 
geographic proximity (Thielemann 2003).   
  6accept a disproportionate number of protection seekers are also the ones with a strong 
commitment to domestic redistribution (extensive welfare states) and above average 
foreign aid contributions (Thielemann 2003).  A state's greater willingness to accept 
burdens (for whatever of the above reasons) often means that it will adopt a relatively 
lenient policy regime (more access, more attractive reception/integration package, 
etc.).  Overall, however, there are reasons to expect that structural determinants are 
more important than policy-related factors for attempts to explain the relative 
distribution of asylum burdens among OECD countries. 
 
Structural Pull Factors 
As shown above, ‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers constitute the majority of those 
arriving in Europe stating humanitarian reasons.  Under the current international 
refugee protection regime, states of first asylum are obliged to determine the status of 
asylum seekers, i.e. assess whether they qualify as refugees under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention.  Differences in structural pull factors (i.e. non policy-related factors that 
make some host countries more attractive than others) have a  very strong effect on 
the relative distribution of asylum seekers.
7  Table 2 (column 1) ranks Western 
European countries according to their average number of asylum applications per 
thousand of population.  It then also ranks the same countries with regard to six 
indicators (columns 2-7) that stand for potential determinants or pull factors for an 
asylum seeker's choice of preferred host country. The correlation coefficient in the 
bottom row of the table, gives an indication as to how closely each of the six 
indicators (explanatory variables) listed correlates with countries' relative asylum 
burden (in column 1).
8  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The first two pull factors are economic in nature.  Economic migration models (Harris 
and Todaro 1970) explain the decision to migrate as one of income maximisation in 
which wealth differentials and differences in employment opportunities constitute 
important pull factors. International migration is expected to be determined by 
                                                 
7 This section draws on Thielemann (2004). 
8  A correlation describes the strength of an association between variables.  For a set of variable pairs, 
the correlation coefficient gives the strength of the association.  The correlation coefficient is a number 
between 0 and 1. If there is no relationship between the predicted values and the actual values the 
correlation coefficient is 0 or very low (the predicted values are no better than random numbers). As 
the strength of the relationship between the predicted values and actual values increases so does the 
correlation coefficient. A perfect fit gives a coefficient of 1.0. 
  7geographic differences in the supply and demand of labour. On this account, it is 
wage differentials and employment opportunities which explain movements from 
low-wage countries to high-wage countries.  In Table 2, we find that the relative 
number of asylum applications is very highly and positively correlated with countries' 
prosperity ranking and one finds a negative and still quite strong correlation with 
countries unemployment rates.  In other words, this suggests that countries which are 
relatively rich and possess relatively favourable labour market opportunities tend to 
receive relatively high numbers of asylum applications.  The third indicator relates to 
historical ties (colonial links, language ties, cultural networks, etc.) between countries 
of origin and destination that often have lead to transport, trade and communication 
links between such countries.  Links which have tended to facilitate movements of 
people from one country to the other (Massey et al., 1993: 445-7). One possible way 
to study the strength of such ties is to estimate the number of current or former 
citizens of a particular country of origin, who are resident in different countries of 
destination. Drawing on this, Table 2 shows that high asylum burdens correlate 
strongly (and positively) with historical links between countries of origin and 
countries of destination.  Host countries in which one already finds a large number of 
people originating from countries from which large numbers of tend to come from, 
are likely to be countries confronted with relatively high asylum burdens.  The fourth 
indicator is more political in nature, and seeks to capture the reputation that a 
particular country of destination enjoys abroad and in particular in the developing 
world from which the large majority of asylum seekers originate from.  Asylum 
seekers can be expected to be concerned about personal security and the difficulties 
they might face regarding their acceptance into a new host society.  Here, we try to 
capture the reputation of a country in terms of its 'liberal credentials' and concern for 
foreigners by analysing countries’ track records in the area of overseas development 
aid. The assumption is that countries which spend relatively more of their GDP on aid 
to the Third World will tend to have a more liberal reputation.  Table 2 finds quite a 
strong and positive correlation between relative asylum burdens and host countries' 
reputation measured in this way. Host countries which spend a relatively high 
proportion of their GDP on overseas development aid tend to attract a relatively high 
share of asylum applications. 
 
  8Fifth, although perhaps less than some years ago as a result of technological 
advancements, geographic distance between countries of origin and destination can 
still be regarded as an important proxy for the cost of movement between countries.  
With regard to the role of geographical factors, we find a negative, albeit weaker, 
correlation between relative asylum burdens and the average distance between 
countries of destination and the five most important countries of origin in any 
particular year.  In other words, those countries which are more closely situated in 
geographic terms to important countries of origin, are the ones more likely to 
encounter a disproportionate share of asylum applications. 
 
Finally one finds quite a weak (and positive) correlation between relative asylum 
burdens and policy related deterrence measures.  Despite quite substantial variation in 
countries' average deterrence index
9 for the time period under investigation, we find 
little evidence for the claim that countries with stricter asylum regimes are the ones 
which find themselves with relatively smaller burdens in comparison to those which 
(on average) have operated more lenient regimes.
10  On the contrary, we find that 
some of the countries (such as Germany, Switzerland and Austria), despite having put 
in place some of the most restrictive asylum policy regimes, nonetheless are among 
the most popular destinations for asylum applicants.  Structural, not policy-related, 
pull factors therefore appear to constitute the most critical factors in explaining the 
unequal distribution of refugee burdens.   
 
 
(3) Types of International Burden-Sharing Regimes 
 
                                                 
9 This index seeks to capture the relative restrictiveness of a countries asylum policy regime.  Due to 
limitations in the available data, it is impossible to include all restrictive measures in the calculation of 
such an index. However, by focusing on five key deterrence measures that capture all three 
principal deterrence dimensions (access, determination and integration), it is possible 
to arrive at a reasonable approximation of such a ranking.  The five indicators are: (1) existence of ‘safe 
third country’ provisions; (2) below average recognition rate; (3) residence restrictions; (4) restrictions 
on access to cash welfare payments and (5) work restrictions.  For each measure I created a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 for each year that a particular measure was in operation in a particular 
country and the value 0 for all other years. This leaves me with an index ranging from between 0 
(lowest deterrent effect) to 5 (highest deterrent effect) for each country in each year.  For a more 
detailed discussion of this index, see Thielemann (2004, 2006).   
10 With the use of more advanced statistical techniques and the use of lagged independent variables, it 
can be shown that while newly introduced deterrence measures can have a significant effect on the 
relative distribution of asylum burden, this effect tends to be short lived due to copy-cat strategies by 
other countries which swiftly cancel out the desired effect of such measures (Thielemann 2006). 
  9What instruments are available to states who want to equalise burdens or 
responsibilities?  One can distinguish two substantively different types of 
international burden-sharing regimes and four principal burden-sharing mechanisms 
(see Table 3).   
 
Table 3: Types of International Burden-Sharing 
 
One dimensional  Multi dimensional 
Common Rules  Compensation 
Redistribution/Quotas Trade 
 
 
First, there are one-dimensional burden-sharing regimes that aim to equalize efforts 
on one particular contribution dimension.  They often seek to equalize international 
efforts in two ways – through common rules/ policy harmonization (ex ante 
equalization) or through redistribution/quotas (ex-post equalization).  The former 
method is based on the assumption that inequalities in burdens can be overcome by 
agreeing on a common set of rules that aims at equalizing the obligations in public 
good provision of individual states.  By obliging states to harmonize their policies or 
to comply with a set of common international rules, it is expected that the burdens that 
individual countries are faced with will converge.  The idea with such ex-ante 
mechanism is that common rules will prevent unequal burdens from arising, thus 
eliminating/reducing the need for corrective action.  In contrast, redistributive 
measures are classical ex-post measures, in the sense that they try to equalize 
observed imbalances/inequities in burdens.  Once a potential or actual imbalance or 
inequity has been observed, measures are employed to address these.  A prominent 
instrument is the use of quotas that distribute burdens according to an agreed 
distribution key (which is usually based on one or several fairness principles such as 
such as responsibility, capacity, benefit or cost).
11  Examples can be found in efforts 
to harmonize aid commitments to developing countries or the control of green house 
gas emissions by the Montreal Protocol.   
 
                                                 
11 The ‘responsibility’ principle is commonly used in environmental regimes and also known as the 
‘polluter pays’ principle.  The ‘capacity’ principle refers to a state’s ‘ability to pay’ (and is often linked 
to relative GDP).  The ‘benefit’ principle proposes that states should contribute to a particular regime in 
relation to the benefit they gain from it and the ‘cost’ principle suggests that states’ relative costs in 
making certain contributions should be taken into account when establishing burden-sharing regimes. 
  10Multi-dimensional burden-sharing regimes are those which do not seek to equalize 
burdens/responsibilities on one particular contribution dimension alone.  On the one 
hand, there are those multi-dimensional regimes which are based on an explicit 
compensation logic.  In these cases, a country’s disproportionate efforts in one 
contribution dimension are recognized and that country gets compensated (through 
benefits or cost-reductions) on other dimensions.  A second type of multi-dimensional  
burden-sharing regimes is based on an explicit trading logic.  Schuck’s (1997) 
‘decentralised, market-based refugee sharing system’ (which has similarities with the 
Kyoto emission trading scheme) would be such an example.  According to this model, 
an international agency would assign to each participating state a refugee protection 
quota on the basis of which states would then be allowed to trade their quota by 
paying others to fulfill their obligation.   
 
Beyond explicit multi-dimensional burden-sharing regimes, the world of international 
diplomacy is full of examples where states, which are unable (or unwilling) to 
contributions on one particular contribution dimension, have been induced through 
moral or other pressure to contribute to the provision of international collective goods 
on another dimension.  The cheque-book diplomacy performed by Japan (and to an 
extent by Germany) in the post World War II period provides only one example.  
Partly unwilling, partly unable (as the result of constitutionally imposed constraints) 
to contribute to military operations by the NATO alliance, the two countries have 
contributed to alliance efforts through financial contributions rather than through 
troops or military hardware, implicitly acknowledging their respective comparative 
advantages and constraints.   
 
 
(4) Refugee Burden-Sharing Regimes in the EU 
 
What types of burden-sharing initiatives have Member States been pursuing in an 
attempt to equalise Member States’ responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees in 
the EU?  When reviewing European legislative initiatives in this area, one finds that 
Member States have developed initiates that are based on the first three of the four 
burden-sharing mechanisms discussed above.  
 
Since the mid 1980s, the  EU has worked towards the convergence of Member States’ 
laws on forced migration. What started with initially non-binding intergovernmental 
  11instruments has since then been followed by developments in Community law.  Most 
noteworthy here are several directives which have aimed to level the asylum playing 
field and to lay the foundations for a Common European Asylum System.
12  The 2003 
Reception Conditions Directive guarantees minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum-seekers, including housing, education and health.  The 2004 Qualification 
Directive contains a clear set of criteria for qualifying either for refugee or subsidiary 
protection status and sets out what rights are attached to each status.  The 2005 
Asylum Procedures Directive seeks to ensure that throughout the EU, all procedures 
at first instance are subject to the same minimum standards.  The significance of these 
initiatives notwithstanding, policy harmonization can of course only address 
imbalances which are due to differences in domestic legislation in the first place. As 
discussed above, policy differences are only one of several determinants for a 
protection seeker’s choice of host country, with structural factors such as historic 
networks, employment opportunities, geography or a host country’s reputation being 
at least equally, if not more, important.  If structural pull factors are indeed so crucial, 
then policy harmonization might actually do more harm than good to the EU's efforts 
to achieve a more equitable distribution of asylum seekers across the Member States.  
EU policy harmonization curtails Member States' ability to use national asylum policy 
to counterbalance their country's unique structural pull-factors (language, colonial 
ties, etc.).  This is why policy harmonization might undermine efforts to achieve to 
more equitable responsibility-sharing (Thielemann 2004). 
 
The most prominent burden-sharing regime that relies on redistributive/quota 
mechanisms can be found in the area of refugee resettlement where both voluntary 
mechanisms and compulsory quotas are used to redistribute refugees across 
territories.  Resettlement schemes are based on the idea of voluntary offers by states 
to accept refugees into their territory.  As we have seen in Table 1 above, some 
Western states have accepted significant numbers of refugees through this route.  One 
finds some very established systems for refugee resettlement in the dispersal regimes 
operated inside in many states.  The UK dispersal scheme is a prominent example 
(Boswell 2003; Berliner Institut 2001.  Given large inflows of refugees that were 
increasing the pressure on already scarce accommodation in London and the South 
                                                 
12 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 
and Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005. 
  12East of England led the UK government to introduce a voluntary dispersal scheme for 
asylum seekers in 1998, followed by a more comprehensive scheme was subsequently 
incorporated into the government’s 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act.  Under this 
scheme, asylum seekers will be dispersed to ‘cluster areas’ outside London and the 
South East, in which there is a sufficient supply of suitable accommodation.
13  The 
Act contains provisions for the reimbursement of participating local authorities for 
any additional costs incurred in accommodating and supporting asylum seekers 
(Boswell 2003).  Under the initial scheme dispersal took place at the expense of the 
local authorities in the South East and London which agreed to compensate local 
authorities n the North.  As the financial burden for London and the South East 
increased, the Home Office introduced the National Asylum Support System (NASS) 
with the 1999 Act which along with accommodation, provides financial support.   
Thus, the UK national government pays volunteering local authorities for the costs of 
the asylum and dispersal system.  A recent EU initiative which is based on a similar 
mechanism is the 2001 Council Directive on Temporary Protection in the Case of 
Mass Influx.
14  The directive develops a range of non-binding mechanisms based on 
the principle of ‘double voluntarism’: the agreement of both the recipient state and the 
individual protection seeker is required before protection seekers can be moved from 
one country to another.  Under this instrument, Member States are expected, in spirit 
of ‘European solidarity’, to indicate their reception capacity and to justify their offers.  
These pledges are to be made in public, allowing for mechanisms of peer pressure or 
‘naming and shaming’.  The directive has not yet been used and therefore the 
effectiveness of this new instrument of ‘soft’ co-ordination still remains to be tested in 
practice. 
 
In the EU, the most developed multi-dimensional refugee burden-sharing regime is 
the European Refugee Fund (ERF), which aims ‘to promote a ‘balance of efforts’ in 
receiving and bearing the consequences of displaced persons’ in order ‘to demonstrate 
solidarity between the Member States’ in their efforts to promote the social and 
economic integration of displaced persons.
15 The ERF does so by allocating common 
European funds to Member States in relation to the numbers of asylum-seekers and 
                                                 
13 Prior to the implementation of the dispersal policy in April 2000, around 90% of asylum seekers 
were housed in London and the South East. 
14 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, OJ L 212, 7 August 2001. 
15 Council Decision of 28 September 2000 (2000/596/EC), L252/12 of 6.10.2000. 
  13refugees that they are dealing with.  It has been in operation since 2000 and has aimed 
to financially compensate those Member States which are faced with disproportionate 
responsibilities in this area by supporting Member States actions aimed to promote the 
social and economic integration of asylum seekers and their return to their countries 
of origin.  The most obvious problem with the ERF has to do with the Fund’s limited 
size (initially EURO 216 million over five years) which compared to national 
expenditures in the area of reception, integration and return of asylum-seekers and 
refugees pales into insignificance.  According to UK Home Office estimates, Britain 
spent just under 30,000 Euro per asylum seeker in 2002, if one includes 
administrative costs, legal bills, accommodation and subsistence. According to figures 
from the ERF’s mid-term review, the UK was the second largest recipient of the Fund 
in 2002, and received approximately 100 Euro ERF money per asylum application 
made in the UK that year. One can therefore conclude that the overall effect of the 
ERF up to now has been more important in symbolic terms, then it has been in terms 
of its substantive effect in promoting a balance of efforts between the Member States. 
Even with the recently agreed tripling of the Fund for the 2005-2010 funding period, 
revenues from the ERF are highly unlikely to alleviate Member States’ concerns 
about the economic (and social) costs associated with refugees and enhance their 
willingness to provide refuge to displaced persons.  When analyzing the allocation of 
ERF resources, one finds that the Fund’s principal beneficiaries have been destination 
countries with the largest absolute number of asylum-seekers and refugees even 
though theses countries arguably were not facing the largest burdens in this area (see 
Table 3).   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The Fund, hence, does not take into account countries' relative absorption capacity.  
This means that for any given number of displaced persons a country like 
Luxembourg receives the same financial help as Germany, irrespective of the two 
countries’ fundamental differences in terms of population or geographic size, etc.  The 
underlying assumption appears to be that a particular number of protection seekers 
received, require the same amount of effort, no matter whether the receiving state is 
small or large, rich or poor, etc.  This is clearly not the case, as a certain number of 
protection seekers received will require greater efforts by a small country than a large 
one.  In other words, the Fund's redistributive element currently compensates Member 
  14States according to the absolute numbers of protection seekers received rather than 
according to the relative responsibilities or burdens that Member States are faced 
with.  The Fund's redistributive impact consequently remains very limited.  From a 
solidarity or burden-sharing perspective, the ERF’s current arrangements therefore 
appear sub-optimal.
16  Ultimately, neither the ERF, nor the other instruments 
described above, can be said to effectively contribute to the goal of responsibility-
sharing. 
 
Given the limitations of the existing EU refugee-sharing initiatives, it might be time to 
further explore the fourth burden-sharing mechanism discussed above: trade.  This is 
the one mechanism that has not yet been used by the Member Stats in their burden-
sharing efforts.  Several objections can be made against a Kyoto style refugee burden-
sharing regime (Schuck 1997) which is based on the idea of ‘explicit trading’ and 
which therefore raises legitimate unease about treating refugees as commodities in 
inter-state transactions (Schuck 1997: 289-297; Anker, Fitzpatrick and Schacknove 
1998).  An alternative 'implicit trade’ model suggests that countries can be expected 
to specialise according to their comparative advantage as to the type and level of 
contribution they make to international collective goods.  Applied to the area of 
forced migration, it has been suggested that countries can contribute to refugee 
protection in two principal ways: proactively, through peace-keeping/making and 
reactively, by providing protection for displaced persons (Thielemann and Dewan 
2006).  With some countries making disproportionate contributions in ‘pro-active’ 
refugee protection contributions (through peace-keeping) and other countries 
contributing in a disproportionate way with ‘reactive’ measures related to refugee 
reception, there appears that some implicit trading in refugee protection contributions 
is already taking place.  Indeed, one finds a consistently negative correlation between 
pro-active refugee protection contributions (measured in troops sent to international 
peace-keeping operations) and reactive refugee protection contributions (the 
acceptance of forced migrants) for the years 1996-2002 across the EU Member States 
(see Table 4). 
 
Moreover, such apparent specialisation in countries' contributions has potentially 
important implications for attempts to develop multi-lateral burden-sharing initiatives 
                                                 
16  For a more extended discussion of the ERF, see Thielemann (2005). 
  15that are perceived to advance states’ interests in providing for more equitable, 
efficient and effective refugee protection.  First, evidence of inter-country 
specialisation suggests that overall refugee protection contributions are perhaps not as 
inequitable is often assumed.  Second, it is possible that burden-sharing initiatives that 
attempt to force all nations to increase contributions in a particular category of 
provision are likely to be counterproductive for the efficient provision of collective 
goods such as refugee protection.  It can then be argued that the provision of this 
collective good is closer to optimality when countries are able to specialize with 
regard to their contributions.  The existence of country-specific benefits from refugee 
protection combined with tendencies for specialisation in states' contributions helps to 
raise the efficiency of refugee protection efforts.  When just looking at reactive 
protection contributions (as most burden-sharing models do), it is tempting to suggest 
that some (larger) countries should be contributing more in this area.  Similarly, 
equalizing reactive contributions also appears to be the general thrust of recent 
European policy initiatives.  However, any attempt to impose quotas and suchlike 
should be seen as a hindrance toward greater specialisation and trade, with adverse 
overall effects.  Burden-sharing initiatives, if they are to strengthen refugee 
protection, need to be aware of variations in states' preferences in this area and need 
to recognise comparative advantages possessed by individual states in this area.  If 
they do not, they risk to undermine the search for more effective refugee protection 
efforts.  
 
 
(5) Conclusion: The need for a more comprehensive burden-sharing approach 
 
This paper has argued that border security in the EU’s single market have been the 
major driving forces behind recent steps to develop a common European asylum 
policy.  Unlike in the US., where the recent terrorist attacks have had a direct impact 
on development in US immigration law, development in EU asylum and refugee 
policy have continued to be dominated by the security implications of the processes 
related to the EU’s ongoing ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’.  It has been shown that the 
distribution of refugee burdens in Europe is highly unequal and that efforts to achieve 
a more ‘equitable balance of efforts’ in this areas have dominated legislative 
developments on asylum in the EU over recent years.  Given the shortcomings of 
existing EU burden-sharing initiatives in this area, the paper has made the case for the 
  16development of more comprehensive refugee burden-sharing regimes.  Against the 
background of an ongoing threat of a continuing erosion of refugee protection 
standards in the face of international collective action problems inherent in refugee 
matters, the need to explore new options in developing an EU asylum policy that is 
based on a more equitable, efficient and effective refugee burden-sharing regime 
appears to be more urgent than ever. 
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Annex: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Average Accepted Protection Burden (1994-2002) 
 
 
2 4 
   1   
3 
 
Country 
Average 
annual 
number of 
Average 
Recognition 
Rate (in  asylum 
applications* percent)** 
Average 
resettlement 
arrivals 
Average 
Accepted 
Protection 
Burden***
Netherlands 35345  62.7  308  1.399 
Switzerland 25208  39.3   0  1.376 
Denmark 8312  61.6  1034  1.181 
Sweden 15556  45.1  1945  1.031 
Norway 7836  35  1494  0.967 
Canada 29755  59.8  10898  0.959 
Belgium 21532  32.3   0  0.678 
Australia 9086  18.1  10222  0.636 
United 
States 75484  29.7 
76243 
0.369 
United 
Kingdom 61077  36.1 
39 
0.362 
Germany 100844  15.7   0  0.188 
France 30595  18.4   0  0.092 
Italy 9223  24.6  0  0.049 
Spain 7352  24   0  0.048 
Japan 187  13.5  162  0.001 
 
* Figures generally refer to the number of persons who applied for asylum. The 
figures used here are generally first instance ("new") applications only.  Source: 
Governments, UNHCR. Compiled by UNHCR (Population Data Unit). See also: 
http://www.unhcr.ch (Statistics). 
** Total recognition rates in industrialised countries (first instance).  Includes persons 
recognized (under Geneva Convention) and those ‘allowed to remain’ (on the basis of 
subsidiary protection) divided by the total of recognized, allowed to remain and 
rejected.  Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks. 
*** Number of asylum seekers given permanent or temporary protection status 
combined with number of resettlement arrivals per 1000 of population per year. 
 Table 2: Determinants of Relative Asylum Burdens (Averages 1985-2000)  
 
     Structural  Determinants 
Policy-Related 
Determinants   
     Economic  Historical  Political  Geographic  Deterrence-Policy   
 
Relative 
Asylum 
Burden  GDP per Capita  Unemployment Rate
Foreign (Born) 
Population ODA  Distance  Deterrence  Index  
1  CHE  3.3  LUX  0.033 ESP  19.5  AUT  60.9  NOR  1.02  PRT  4886  DEU  4.5  1 
2  SWE  2.6  CHE 0.032 IRE  14.4 DEU  41.6  SWE  0.92  ESP  4461  CHE 4.0 2 
3  DEU  2.0  NOR  0.028 BEL  12.1  DNK  29.6  DNK  0.86  IRE  4355  AUT  3.0  3 
4 DNK  1.8  DNK  0.026 ITA  11.2  NLD 26.3 CHE  0.68  NOR 4224 PRT  2.9  4 
5  AUT  1.7  SWE  0.025 FRA  10.6  CHE  21.8  DEU  0.51  GBR  4043  GRC  2.8  5 
6  NLD 1.7  DEU  0.023 FIN  9.4  SWE 16.4 FIN  0.41 FRA 3918 FRA  2.5  6 
7  BEL  1.6  FIN  0.022 DNK  9.0  NOR  9.7  AUT  0.40  BEL  3805  ITA  2.5  7 
8  NOR 1.3  AUT  0.021 GRC  8.1  BEL  9.6  FRA  0.36 NLD 3783 ESP  2.2  8 
9  LUX  0.9  FRA  0.021 GBR  7.9  FRA  7.4  LUX  0.36  LUX  3718  NLD  1.8  9 
10 FRA  0.6  NLD 0.020 DEU  7.9  ITA  5.3  NLD 0.36  CHE  3642  LUX  1.6  10 
11  GBR  0.5  BEL  0.020 NLD  7.0  FIN  3.9  BEL  0.34  FIN  3612  DNK  1.5  11 
12  IRE  0.5  GBR  0.018 AUT  6.0 GBR  1.3  IRE  0.27  DNK  3502  IRE 1.5  12 
13  GRC  0.3  ITA  0.018 PRT  5.9  GRC   -   ITA  0.26  SWE  3473  BEL  0.9  13 
14  FIN  0.3  IRE 0.016 SWE  4.5 IRE    -    ESP  0.22  ITA  3409  NOR 0.9 14 
15  ESP  0.2  ESP  0.012 NOR  4.1  LUX   -   GBR  0.21  DEU  3380  SWE  0.8  15 
16  ITA  0.2  GRC  0.009 CHE  2.5  PRT   -   PRT  0.18  AUT  3166  GBR  0.8  16 
17  PRT  0.0  PRT  0.008 LUX  2.2  ESP   -   GRC  0.14  GRC  2929  FIN  0.8  17 
Correlation 
Coefficient    1.00     0.70     -0.52     0.63     0.43     -0.37     0.21 
 
 
AUT: Austria; BEL: Belgium; CHE: Switzerland; DEU: Germany; DNK: Denmark; ESP: Spain; FIN: Finland; FRA: France; GBR: Great 
Britain; GRC: Greece; IRE: Ireland; ITA: Italy; LUX: Luxemburg; NLD: Netherlands; NOR: Norway; PRT: Portugal; SWE: Sweden. 
  
 
Table 3: The Redistributive Impact of the European Refugee Fund 
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Figure 1: Average Accepted Protection Burden (by ascending GNP size), 1994-2002 
  
Table 4: Correlation of pro-active (peace-keeping troops) vs. reactive (refugees) 
protection contributions, (EU Member States, 1996-2002) 
 
 
 
-0.26  2002 
-0.42  2001 
-0.52  2000 
-0.27  1999 
-0.15  1998 
-0.28  1997 
-0.15  1996  
References:  
 
ANKER, Deborah., FITZPATRICK, Joan. and Andrew. SHACKNOVE (1998), 
Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 295-310. 
BERLINER INSTITUT (fuer Vergleichende Sozialforschung) (2001), 
Decentralisation of Asylum: Refugee Reception Procedures in the European 
Union, Report fund by the European Refugee Fund Community Actions 2001. 
Betts, Alexander (2003), ‘Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee 
Protection: The Role of the Joint-Product Model in Burden-Sharing Theory’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies, 16:3, pp. 274-296.  
Bigo, Didier (1994), The European Internal Security Field: stakes and rivalries in a 
newly developing area of police intervention, in Anderson, Malcolm & den Boer, 
Monica, Policing Across National Boundaries (London: Pinter, 1994). 
BOSWELL, Christina (2003).  Burden-Sharing in the EU: Lessons from the German 
and UK Experience, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. 
BYRNE Rosemary, Gregor NOLL and Jens VEDSTED-HANSEN (eds.) (2002), New 
Asylum Countries: Migration Control and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged 
European Union, The Hague: Kluwer. 
Guild, Elspeth (2003) International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and 
Border Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 8: 331-346. 
GUIRAUDON Virginie (2000) European Integration and Migration Policy : Vertical 
Policy-making as Venue Shopping, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/2, pp. 
251-71. 
HARRIS, J.R. and M.P. TODARO (1970), Migration, unemployment, and 
development: A two-sector analysis, American Economic Review, Vol. 60, pp. 
126-42. 
Huysmans, Jeff. (2000) ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 38, pp. 751-777. 
LAVENEX, Sandra and Emek UÇARER, eds. 2002. Migration and the Externalities 
of European Integration, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 
MASSEY, D. S, ARANGO, J., Hugo, G., KOUAOUCI, A., PELLEGRINO, A. and 
J.E. TAYLOR (1993), Theories of International Migration: A Review and 
Appraisal, Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 431-66. 
NOLL Gregor (2000), Negotiating Asylum, the EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Asylum 
and the Common. Market of Deflection, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
OLSON, Mancur. and Richard. ZECKHAUSER (1966). “An economic theory of 
alliances.” Review of Economics and Statistics 48: 266-79. 
SANDLER, Todd. (1992). Collective Action--Theory and Applications, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
SCHUCK, Peter. (1997). “Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal.” Yale 
Journal of International Law 22. 
STETTER, Stephan (2000) Regulating migration: authority delegation in justice and 
home affairs, Journal of European Public Policy, 7: 1, pp. 80-102. 
SUHRKE, Astri (1998). “Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of 
Collective Action versus National Action.” Journal of Refugee Studies 11(4): 396-
415. 
  23THIELEMANN Eiko Ralph. and Torun. DEWAN (2006), The Myth of Free-Riding: 
Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing, West European Politics, Vol. 29, 
No. 2, pp. 351-69. 
THIELEMANN, Eiko Ralph (2005) Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing? 
Redistribution, Side-Payments and the European Refugee Fund, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 807-24 
THIELEMANN, Eiko Ralph (ed.) (2003) European Burden-Sharing and Forced 
Migration, special issue of the Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.16, No.3. 
THIELEMANN, Eiko Ralph. (2003) Between Interests and Norms: Explaining 
Patterns of Burden-Sharing in Europe, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.16, No.3, 
pp. 253-73. 
THIELEMANN, Eiko Ralph. (2004) Why European Policy Harmonization 
Undermines Refugee Burden-Sharing, European Journal of Migration and Law, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 43-61.  
  24